Statehood and the Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case for Puerto Rican Seabed Rights by unknown
Notes
Statehood and the Equal Footing Doctrine:
The Case for Puerto Rican Seabed Rights
In the near future, negotiations between Puerto Rico and the
United States will probably explore statehood as an alternative to the
island's current "commonwealth" status.' The island's dearth of land-
I. Commonwealth status means the island enjoys self-government in local affairs under
its own constitution and association with the United States under the Puerto Rican
Federal Relations Act of 1950, §§ 1, 4, 48 U.S.C. §§ 731(b), 731(e) (1970). For a discussion
of the continuing debate concerning the nature of commonwealth status, see Cabranes,
Puerto Rico: Out of the Colonial Closet, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1978, at 66.
The island's ongoing economic difficulties have exacerbated dissatisfaction with the
commonwealth arrangement and the island's political parties are voicing demands for a
status change. See, e.g., Garcia Passalacqua, 20 Years of Anticolonialism, San Juan Star,
Apr. 23, 1977, at 27, col. 2 (attacks on commonwealth status have brought "[c]olonialism
in Puerto Rico" to "its deathbed"); Puerto Rican Factions Hit Island Status, Wash. Post,
Aug. 19, 1977, at Al, col. 6 ("For the first time, virtually the whole spectrum of political
opinion in Puerto Rico appeared before a U.N. committee ... and criticized the island's
commonwealth status.")
Statehood is currently the foremost alternative to the "fast collaps[ing]" common-
wealth. Garcia Passalacqua, Hispanic State or La Republica-IV, San Juan Star, Mar. 3,
1977, at 27, col. 2. The island's statehood parties since 1952 have received increasingly
larger percentages of the vote, culminating in the 48.3% that they received in 1976. See
Letter from Michael E. Veve, Director, Legal Counsel Section of the Office of the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico to Jos6 A. Cabranes, Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School (Mar.
28, 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Although this percentage partly reflected
protests against the island's economic state under the commonwealth party, the trend
toward statehood is clear. Puerto Rico: the oil issue, 11 LATIN AMERICA PoL-rlcAr. REt'.,
Feb. 4, 1977, at 38.
President Ford's New Year's Eve statehood proposal suggests some United States sup-
port for the statehood alternative. See President Proposes Puerto Rican State; Urges U.S.
Initiative, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1977, at 1, col. 6. President-elect Carter indicated his will-
ingness to support statehood "'if the people who live there prefer that.'" Carter Weighing
Personnel to Fill Sub-Cabinet Jobs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1977, at 1, col. 5 & 44, col. 5. A
Gallup poll conducted in December 1976 found three out of every five Americans in
favor of statehood for Puerto Rico. 59% on Mainland Favor State in Gallup Inc. Poll,
San Juan Star, Jan. 5, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
A bid for statehood by Puerto Rico has increasingly been viewed as inevitable. See, e.g.,
Puerto Rico Turnabout, Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1977, at A14, col. I (editorial) (although
mainland has focused little attention on issue of statehood for Puerto Rico, "question is
coming"); Ramos, Has P.R. Passed The Point Of No Return? San Juan Star, Jan. 15, 1977,
at 19, col. 2 ("island's economic absorption by the U.S. will inevitably result in its com-
plete political absorption through statehood"). But see Nordheimer, Puerto Rico Is Torn
by Dispute Over Seeking Statehood Status, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1978, at 1, col. 4 (statehood
will not receive more than simple majority in plebiscite and Congress likely to reject
statehood petition).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 825, 1979
based resources and its ongoing economic stagnation and poverty,2
coupled with the possibility of offshore oil and mineral wealth,3 will
create political pressures for Puerto Rico to demand exclusive rights to
exploit its surrounding seabed4 in an area ranging from nine to 200
2. See, e.g., Hoyt, The Mineral Industry of Puerto Rico, 2 MIN. Y.B. 623, 624 (1974)
(island's mineral production includes only cement, clay, lime, salt, sand and gravel, and
stone); Lens, Puerto Rico could become the United States' next Vietnam, Dallas Times
Herald, Aug. 14, 1977, at I-1, col. I & 1-8, col. I (discovery of copper and nickel deposits
may allay but will not cure island's economic problems).
Since the increase in oil prices in 1972, the island has been beset by serious economic
difficulties. See, e.g., Nordheimer, supra note 1, at 56, col. I (Puerto Rico has become
"'welfare state', with 63 percent of the population qualifying for Federal food stamps");
60% of Puerto Ricans' Income Below Poverty Level, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1977, at 5, col.
2 ("[u]nemployment [over 30%], inflation and high taxes . . . have seriously crippled
Puerto Rico's economy").
3. Studies have shown the possibility of oil and gas deposits from two to nine miles off
the northern coasts of the island. The deposits could yield an estimated 200,000 barrels
of oil per day, an amount sufficient to supply the island's current daily consumption of
140,000 barrels. Letter from Michael E. Veve, Director, Legal Counsel Section of the
Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Mar. 31, 1977) (on file with Yale Law
Journal). Other reports have indicated strong possibilities of limestone or dolomite off
the northern coasts. Western Geophysical Company, Evaluation of Hydrocarbon Prospects
of the Island of Puerto Rico, Final Report 12 (Feb. 1975) (report to Puerto Rico Water
Resources Authority) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Mobil Oil Corporation has offered
to explore for oil in three northern coast locations. Licha, Exploracidn en Tres Puntos, El
Nuevo Dia, Feb. 5, 1977, at 2, col. 1. The discovery of manganese nodules, potato-shaped
pellets each containing a wealth of cobalt, nickel, copper, and manganese, have reportedly
been made within 200 miles of Puerto Rico's southern coast. Passalacqua Christian,
Romero's miraculous fish oil-Il, San Juan Star, Mar. 19, 1977, at 24, col. 1.
4. Puerto Rico might also seek rights to conserve and manage fishing in a 200-mile
economic zone, see note 116 infra (defining economic zone), off its coasts. The United
States has recently declared such a zone. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 101, 90 Stat. 336 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976)); cf. In-
formal Composite Negotiating Text of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, arts. 56, 57, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 62/W.P.10 (July 15, 1977) (recognizing 200-mile
exclusive economic zone over living and nonliving natural resources) [hereinafter cited
as Composite Text]. Although Puerto Rico's demands for rights over the seabed and over
fishing management might involve a similar 200-mile limit, the two demands would
involve different rights, responsibilities, and duties. Compare Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, art. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/L.55 (Apr. 29, 1958) (declaring rights to exploit continental shelf exclusive
to coastal state) [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention] with Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.54 (Apr. 28, 1958)
(recognizing coastal states's right to impose regulations to conserve fish but prohibiting
discrimination against foreign fishermen) [hereinafter cited as Fishing Convention].
Puerto Rico would likely seek the exclusive right to explore and exploit the natural
resources of the seabed. See p. 845 infra. The federal government currently authorizes
the Secretary of the Interior "to grant to the highest responsible qualified bidder" leases
for the exploration and development of the submerged lands under national control.
See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, § 205(a), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a) (West Supp.
1978). A payment of royalty is required. Id. § 1337(b). Similarly, Texas authorizes a
School Land Board to lease to the highest bidder the exploration and exploitation
rights to its submerged lands. See TEx. NAT. Ras. CODE ANN. tit. II, §§ 52.011, .019
(Vernon 1977). Louisiana, on the other hand, authorizes its State Mineral Board to
issue leases to the bidder making the "bid most advantageous to the state." See Lt. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 30:127(a) (West Supp. 1978). In the Mining Law of 1975, P.R. LAws ANN. tit.
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miles into the sea.5 The inclusion of such a provision in Puerto Rico's
compact of admission could be politically necessary and practically
essential.0
Nevertheless, because such an agreement would grant the island
28, § 117(A) (Supp. 1977), the Secretary of Natural Resources of Puerto Rico is directed
to obtain from leases of submerged lands "the highest financial return possible, consistent,
however, with the widest possible exploitation or extraction of the commercial mineral."
This history of exploitation of submerged lands indicates that the island would follow a
leasing program if it were to secure the right to explore its seabed as a state.
5. There is presently considerable disagreement about whether Puerto Rico or the
United States has the right to exploit the island's seabed resources. See Puerto Rico: the
oil issue, supra note 1, at 37 (United States and Puerto Rico "waging a quiet but
persistent struggle . . . over the island's title to offshore mineral rights"); Agrait, Puerto
Rico y la Tercera Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas Sobre el Derecho Del Mar (un-
published paper) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (history of island's efforts to secure
rights over seabed at Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea). In its
Mining Law of 1975, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 28, § III (Supp. 1977), the island claimed
ownership of all exploitable commercial minerals in its continental shelf, which at present
extend about 12 miles into the sea. Passalacqua Christian, Romero's miraculous fish oil,
San Juan Star, Mar. 9, 1977, at 16, col. 1. The United States failed to recognize this claim
and Puerto Rico submitted a bill to Congress, H.R. 7827, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),
still in committee, seeking jurisdiction, like that exercised by Texas and Florida, over
three marine leagues (nine nautical miles). Passalacqua Christian, Island 'adrift in a
leaky canoe', San Juan Star, Mar. 6, 1978, at 15, col. 2.
Commonwealth supporters have been lobbying for Puerto Rico to claim control over
the 200-mile economic zone recognized in the Composite Text, supra note 4, arts. 56, 57.
See, Bryan, CoPaken Cree la Isla Estd Perdiendo Oportunidad Para Que se Establezca
Limite Sobre sus Aguas Territoriales, El Mundo, Feb. 21, 1977, at 11-B, col. 5; RHC calls
for Pressure on U.S. to obtain rights to offshore oil, San Juan Star, July 1, 1977, at 3, col. 1.
The United States has declared its rights over the continental shelf to the limits of its
exploitability. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, § 202, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West
Supp. 1978). In the Third Law of the Sea Conference, the United States proposed the
recognition of a 200-mile economic zone, see note 116 infra (defining economic zone), in
which coastal nations could exclusively exploit the natural resources of the seabed. Docu-
ments of the Second Committee, United States Draft Articles, 3(2) Third U.N. Conference
on the Law of the Sea (Caracas, Venez.) 222, arts. 1, 2, U.N. SALES No. E.75. V.5 (Aug.
8, 1974). Thus by the time the question of statehood for Puerto Rico is faced by
Congress, the United States may well recognize a 200-mile shelf zone. Therefore Puerto
Rico could at a minimum ask for control to the limit of exploitability, 12 miles, and at the
maximum request the 200 miles being recognized by the international community. See
Composite Text, supra note 4, art. 57.
6. It is unlikely that opposing political parties of the island would allow statehood
negotiators to concede to the federal government Puerto Rican resources as valuable as
those of the seabed. See, e.g., Passalacqua Christian, supra note 3 (seabed resources have
potential of "reducing and ending... dependence on Federal Aid Programs ... [and it]
would not look good for [Governor] to be accused of giving away to the Federal Govern-
ment Puerto Rico's natural resources and thus binding us over in the bondage of Federal
dole forever"); RHC Calls for Pressure on U.S. to Obtain Rights to Offshore Oil, supra
note 5 (former Governor calls on statehood government to demand 200-mile zone).
Seabed resources would aid Puerto Rico in solving the economic difficulties exacerbated
by its mineral deficiencies, especially in oil, see note 2 supra, and may be necessary to
compensate for the increased economic burdens imposed by statehood. See UNITED STATES-
PUERTO Rico COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF PUERTO Rico, HEAINGS ON THE STATUS OF
PUERTO Rico, S. Doc. No. 108, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 593-602 (1966) (Dr. Alvin Mayne)
(statehood would require greater contribution to federal purse, and labor costs would in-
crease prohibitively if federal minimum wage laws applied to island). But see id. at 623-35
(Arthur Burns) (statehood for Puerto Rico is economically feasible).
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seabed rights denied to any of the fifty states at their admission to the
Union,7 it would probably meet with opposition based on the "equal
footing doctrine." That doctrine "prevents extension of the sover-
eignty of a State into a domain of political and sovereign power of the
United States from which the other States have been excluded" when
the state enters the Union.9 Although the Supreme Court in Alabama
v. Texas' ° held that Congress has the power under the property clause
of the Constitution to grant existing states unequal seabed rights,"
7. See pp. 832-33 infra (discussing United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), which
vested seabed rights in federal government at state's admission because of equal footing
doctrine).
8. See note 9 infra.
Another objection involves a possibility that the Puerto Rican government might seek
to favor its citizens in granting rights to exploit the seabed. See Mining Law of 1975, P.R.
LAws ANN. it. 28, § 117(14) (Supp. 1977) (requiring every person who leases right to
extract commercial minerals to agree that "insofar as economically possible, persons
residing in Puerto Rico be employed for the works originating and carried out under
such lease, and that such persons be trained in such operations as require technical
skills"). Puerto Rico as a state, however, would be subject to challenges of such actions
based on the privileges-and-immunities and equal protection clauses. U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-403 (1948) (South Carolina
licensing scheme discriminating against nonresident fishermen declared invalid under
privileges-and-immunities clause); Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46,
56-58 (D. Md. 1975) (Maryland statute requiring processors to have office in state con-
trary to equal protection clause). It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the
propriety of such favoritism by a state toward its own citizens.
9. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1950) (plurality opinion). The equal
footing requirement first appeared in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, see I TnE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 168 (M. Jensen ed.
1976) (quoting Ordinance in full), as a condition demanded by Virginia for its cession
of western lands to the Union, see Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3
BAYLOR L. REv. 519, 523 (1951) (history of equal footing clause). Beginning with the
admission of Tennessee in 1796, all states were admitted using the equal footing clause. Id.
Congressional concern and belief in the necessity for "equality" of states was quite
evident when Hawaii attempted, during its statehood negotiations, to secure control over
the seabed between its islands and was rebuffed by equal footing arguments. See State-
hood for Hawaii: Hearings on S. 49, S. 51 & H.R. 3575 Before the Senate Comm. on In-
terior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 40-53 (1954) (history of
Hawaii's demands and their resolution). Hawaii finally agreed to accept a condition in
its act of admission that the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 "shall be applicable to the
State of Hawaii, and the said State shall have the same rights as do existing states there-
under." Id. pt. 3, at 725.
It seems probable that similar equal footing arguments will arise during Puerto Rico's
negotiations over statehood because it is so often assumed that entering the Union would
automatically require relinquishment to the federal government by the island of its rights
to seabed resources. See, e.g., O'Toole, Offshore Oil Issue Raised in P.R. Proposal, Wash.
Post, Jan. 2, 1977, at A2, col. 3 (President Ford's statehood proposal may have been
motivated by desire to federalize island's offshore resources); Passalacqua Christian, supra
note 3 (island's rights over seabed would disappear if it became state; under statehood it
would be entitled to only. three miles under United States laws). Finally, precedent in-
dicates that opposition by existing states or the executive might arise if the island were
granted disproportionate rights. See notes 101 & 102 infra.
10. 347 U.S. 272 (1954) (per curiam).
11. Id. at 273; see U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States .... ")
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the Court has not directly addressed the question whether the equal
footing doctrine permits Congress to grant rights to an incoming state
that exceed those granted to any existing state at its admission.
12
This Note suggests a new historical analysis of the equal footing
doctrine that demonstrates that the doctrine poses no barrier to such
an extensive seabed grant upon Puerto Rico's admission into the
Union. The Note defines the submerged lands issues left unsettled by
the case law, and derives a framework for the equal footing doctrine
from a historical analysis of submerged lands and equal footing cases.
It then applies this framework to Puerto Rico's claims and demon-
strates that Congress may, without violating the equal footing doc-
trine, cede seabed rights to the island on admission.' Finally, the Note
suggests considerations for the language of such an agreement and
defines its limitations.
I. The Allocation of Seabed Rights
In a long line of cases,14 the Supreme Court has invoked the equal
footing doctrine to vest control over the seabed in the federal govern-
ment.15 Although their reasoning and results have been subjected to
numerous criticisms,"6 the cases retain their precedential value.1 7 The
12. See pp. 832-33, 838 infra.
A mere expectancy or even a promise of seabed control after admission would not be a
sufficient guarantee for Puerto Rico as it commits itself to the irrevocable status of
statehood. Seabed rights are inextricably tied to the other economic and political issues
surrounding Puerto Rican statehood. See note 6 supra. The grant of seabed rights must
be simultaneous with admission. See Passalacqua Christian, supra note 3 (admission to
Union without full seabed rights would be "cruel jest" on Puerto Rican people).
13. The present Governor of Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero Barcelo, has declared that
if his party is returned to power in 1980, he will pursue a plebiscite for statehood the
next year. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 1978, at 35. In order to make an objective and informed
decision concerning their future, the Puerto Rican people need to understand the dif-
ference between the constitutional and the political prices that statehood would require.
The equal footing framework developed in this Note can be applied to test the constitu-
tional basis of any condition for admission demanded by Congress or by Puerto Rico.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana,
339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
15. See pp. 831-33 infra.
16. See, e.g., Hanna, The Submerged Land Cases, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 201, 204 (1951)
("few judicial decisions . . . contrary to the expressed views of more well-informed
lawyers"); Naujoks, Title to Lands Under Navigable Waters, 32 MARQ. L. Rv. 7, 37
(1948) ("United States Supreme Court is wrong . . . in holding that the Federal Govern-
ment has paramount rights to the tidelands"). But see Clark, National Sovereignty and
Dominion Over Lands Underlying the Ocean, 27 TEx. L. REv. 140, 141 (1948) ("historical,
political and practical" reasons exist for federal dominion over seabed).
17. See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 519, 524 (1975) (reaffirming reasoning
and results of cases vesting rights over seabed in federal government). A Special Master
appointed by the Court to take and review evidence in Maine found that the historical
conclusions of the submerged lands cases were correct. Report of Albert B. Mars, Special
Master, at 75-81, United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Special
Master's Report]. The Court in Maine accepted the Master's findings. 420 U.S. at 522-25.
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cases merit careful analysis, because the Court has never explicitly
decided whether the equal footing doctrine is a constitutional limita-
tion on the power of Congress to set the terms for admission into the
Union and, if so, whether this limitation precludes Congress from
granting disproportionate seabed rights to an incoming state.
Until the 1940s, the leading authority concerning states' rights to
control over the seabed was the 1845 case of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan.'
s
Pollard held that because Alabama had been admitted to the Union
on an "equal footing" with the other states, it was entitled to the same
rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction over shorelands as were possessed
by the original states.19 For over a century Pollard stood for the broad
proposition that states owned title to all "navigable waters, and the
soils under them" 20 within their historic boundaries.21 A series of
Supreme Court decisions from 1947 to 1950, the Tidelands Cases,22
18. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). In Pollard, the Court rejected plaintiff's claim to
certain shorelands based on a federal patent issued after Alabama's admission into the
Union. Plaintiff had argued that the United States in Alabama's compact of admission
retained ownership of the lands. Id. at 220-21.
19. Id. at 228-29. The Court held that, at the time of the American Revolution, "'the
people of each state became themselves sovereign,'" and possessed the absolute right to
all navigable waters and soils within the colony. Id. at 229 (quoting Martin v. Waddell,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842)). The independent colonies retained this sovereign right
at the formation of the Union. Id.
The Court in Pollard also invoked the premise that the federal government could not
permanently hold or condemn lands within the boundaries of a state without the state's
express consent. Id. at 223. The Constitution reserved title to "shores of navigable waters,
and the soils under them" to the original states. Id. at 230. Alabama was admitted on an
equal footing, because the Court imputed to the state at the time of its admission
ownership of and sovereignty over all lands that it did not explicitly cede to the federal
government in its compact of admission. Id. at 223. The Court found that a provision
reserving for the United States waste and unappropriated lands (public lands) did not
include shorelands, and that a condition concerning freedom of navigable waters was
only a "regulation of commerce" and did not confer property rights on the United
States. Id. at 230. Therefore, the federal patent to plaintiff was invalid. Id.
It was not until 1875, in Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875), that the Supreme
Court held that the power of eminent domain was inherent in sovereignty and that,
consequently, in order to implement its constitutional functions, the United States could
condemn lands within a state without the state's consent. Id. at 373-74. In United States
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), the Court plurality further held that an express state grant
at admission was not necessary in order for a state to relinquish title to the United
States. Id. at 718.
20. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 230.
21. Pollard actually held that states owned title to all "shores of navigable waters, and
the soils under them." Id. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, subsequent cases interpreted
Pollard to mean that a state owned title to all tide waters and their beds within the
state's territorial boundaries. See, e.g., The Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166, 175 (1912); Mc-
Cready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394-95 (1876). For a general history of cases relying on
the Pollard rule, see Naujoks, supra note 16, at 21-37.
22. "Tidelands" is a misnomer given to three submerged lands cases-United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 "(1950), and United
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). See Hyder, United States v. California, 19 Miss.
L.J. 265, 265 & nn.2-3 (1948) (Tidelands Cases involved lands under tide waters and not
tidelands, lands covered and uncovered by ordinary tide).
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overturned this broad reading of Pollard, but failed to provide a con-
sistent or clear framework for evaluating subsequent equal footing
claims.
In the first Tidelands Case, United States v. California,23 the Court
upheld the federal government's claim to all submerged land rights in
the three-mile marginal sea 24 claimed by California..2 5 Because the
original states had never acquired imperium (regulatory power) or
dominium (ownership interest)26 over the submerged lands of the
marginal sea, and because California was admitted to the Union on
an equal footing with the original states, the Court held that California
had demonstrated no ownership of the claimed area.27 Pollard was
distinguished by the fact that acquisition, protection, and control of
the three-mile marginal belt "has been and is a function of national
external sovereignty. ' 28 Thus, lands in which "national interests" such
as defense, commerce, and foreign affairs were dominant were deemed
23. 232 U.S. 19 (1947).
24. "Marginal sea" and "territorial sea" refer to the three-mile belt of water measured
from the seaward edge of inland waters. See United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22
(1969) (defining terms); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 258 (1891) (recognizing
one league as minimum limit).
25. 332 U.S. at 34-36, 39-40. California argued that because the original states acquired
title to the three-mile belt from the English Crown and because it had been admitted on
an equal footing with the original states, it acceded to the same right of title over the
submerged lands. Id. at 23. California also pleaded several defenses all of which the Court
dismissed summarily. Id. at 23-24 & n.2, 39-40.
26. The California majority held that national interests required that the federal
government have the "powers of dominion and regulation" over the marginal belt. Id.
at 35. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, used the terms "dominium" and "imperium," id.
at 43-44, to refer to what the majority labelled "dominion" and "regulation." He argued
that although the majority was right in denying California a proprietary interest or
dominium over submerged lands and in asserting that national interests conferred
regulatory power on the federal government, the majority failed to explain how the
federal government acquired dominium. Id. at 44. Justice Frankfurter's "imperium" and
"dominium" terminology was later adopted by the plurality in United States v. Texas,
339 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1950).
27. 332 U.S. at 32, 38-39. Without an evidentiary hearing, the Court said that it could
not conclude that "the thirteen original colonies separately acquired ownership of the
three-mile belt or the soil under it, even if they did acquire elements of the sovereignty
of the English Crown by their revolution against it." Id. at 31 (footnote omitted). In
United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975), a Special Master finally conducted a hearing
on historical evidence, see Special Master's Report, supra note 17, at 25-65, and the Court
explicitly found that the colonies had not owned the three-mile belt. 420 U.S. at 522.
But see Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26
TEx. L. Rtv. 398, 408-26 (1948) (colonies and original states were landowners of sub-
merged lands).
28. 332 U.S. at 34. The Court limited the Pollard rule to cover only state ownership
of inland waters and soils under them (land between the lines of the ordinary high and
low water marks). Id. at 36. The Pollard rule had been applied in other cases involving
the marginal sea. See note 21 supra (citing cases). The California Court read those cases
as involving only the right of states to regulate fishing in the absence of conflicting con-
gressional legislation. 332 U.S. at 37-38.
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to be within the "paramount rights" and powers of the federal govern-
ment after the admission of a state into the Union.2 9
Three years later, the Court followed California "a fortiori" in
United States v. Louisiana,30 and expanded its reasoning in United
States v. Texas.3 ' Texas, as an independent republic, had claimed and
exercised both imperium and dominium over submerged lands three
marine leagues (nine nautical miles) from its shore. 32 Texas argued
that at its admission it ceded to the United States only imperium, and
not dominium, to this area.33 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court
plurality, disagreed, holding that "although dominium and imperium
are normally separable and separate, ' 3 4 "national interests and national
responsibilities" compelled federal control of both regulatory and
property interests in the seabed.35 Because it entered the Union on an
equal footing with the original states,3 6 Texas automatically lost all
29. 332 U.S. at 34-36, 38-39.
30. 339 U.S. 699, 705 (1950). Based on a 1938 state statute, Louisiana claimed control
over the seabed within 27 miles of its shores. Id. at 703. The United States sought a
declaration of its rights to the area. Id. at 701. The Court held that the federal govern-
ment's sovereignty extended to the entire area claimed by Louisiana, even though no
federal claim to the seabed beyond three miles had been proven. Id. at 704-05. The
Truman Proclamation of 1945, Exec. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67, 68 (1945), had
declared United States "jurisdiction and control" over the continental shelf, but, as was
explained in an accompanying release, Exec. Order No. 9633, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1945), the
Truman Proclamation did not purport to vest title to the shelf in either the federal or
state governments. But see Note, Conflicting State and Federal Claims of Title in Sub-
merged Lands of the Continental Shelf, 56 YALE L.J. 356, 369 (1947) (Supreme Court
could use Truman Proclamation to vest title to shelf in federal government). It was not
until three years after Louisiana that Congress declared it "to be the policy of the United
States that the subsoil and seabed of the [shelf area outside the marginal sea] appertain
to the United States." Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-212,
§ 3, 67 Stat. 462 (codified at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Vest Supp. 1978)). Once again, as in
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), the Court in Louisiana failed to explain
how the federal government acquired dominium over the shelf. See note 26 supra (dis-
cussing California Court's failure to explain national acquisition of dominium).
31. 339 U.S. 707 (1950) (plurality opinion). The United States in Texas sought a
declaration of rights over the submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico bordering Texas.
Id. at 709.
32. Id. at 712-13. The Court plurality assumed the validity of Texas's claim that it had
exercised imperium and dominium over the three marine league belt as a Republic. Id.
at 717.
33. Id. at 712-13. The intention to cede only imperium, Texas argued, was evidenced
by the retention of vacant and unappropriated lands in its compact of admission. Id. at
714-15; see Joint Resolution for annexing Texas to the United States, J. Res. 8, 28th
Cong., 2d Sess. 797 (1845). The United States responded by arguing that Texas's grant of
all property necessary to the public defense impliedly ceded the marginal belt to the
federal government. 339 U.S. at 714-15.
34. 339 U.S. at 719 (footnote omitted).
35. Id.
36. Justice Douglas found the equal footing doctrine to control and bind the substance
of admission even without the agreement of the state to the terms of the admission
declaration. The Justice relied on the equal footing clause of the Joint Resolution for
annexing Texas to the United States, J. Res. 8, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 797 (1845), to dispose
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seabed dominium to the federal government.37
In 1953, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act,3s which vested
ownership of the marginal sea and its resources in the states39 and
provided that states could claim a greater seaward boundary to a limit
of three marine leagues in the Gulf of Mexico4" if "it was so provided
by its constitution or laws prior to or at the time such State became a
member of the Union, or if it has been heretofore approved by Con-
gress." 41 In a per curiam decision in Alabama v. Texas, 42 the Court
denied the motions of Alabama and Rhode Island for leave to file
complaints challenging the constitutionality of the Submerged Lands
Act.43 Alabama and Rhode Island claimed that by granting some Gulf
states an extended boundary over the three miles to the three marine
league limit, the Submerged Lands Act violated the equal footing
guarantees in their acts of admission and resulted in their "inferior
sovereignty.
'44
The Court, which included only three members of the majority that
had decided the Tidelands Cases, summarily upheld the Submerged
Lands Act on the ground that Congress, under the property clause of
of the controversy. 339 U.S. at 719. Texas, however, was not admitted under that "Joint
Resolution" but under the Joint Resolution for the Admission of Texas into the Union,
J. Res. 1, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1845). The latter resolution was never "submitted to
nor accepted by Texas." Hanna, supra note 9, at 520. The Court plurality later ordered
the amendment of the Texas opinion to make correct reference to the proper document.
United States v. Texas, 340 U.S. 848 (1950).
37. 339 U.S. at 718.
38. Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970)).
The Act was intended to undo the effects of the Tidelands triad. See S. REP. No. 133,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE CONr. & AD. NEWS 1474, 1481
("purpose of [Submerged Lands Act] to write the law ... as the Supreme Court believed
it to be in the past-that the States shall own . . . all lands under navigable waters
within their territorial jurisdiction"); H.R. REP. No. 695, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 5, reprinted
in [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEiWs 1395, 1399 (Submerged Lands Act fixed as law
that which prior to California "believed and accepted to be the law of the land"--that
states own submerged lands within their boundaries). The Supreme Court viewed the
Act as an exercise of Congress's power to dispose of public property, and not as a
mandate to overturn the Tidelands Cases. See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 7
(1960).
39. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1970).
40. Id. § 1301(b) ("in no event shall the term 'boundaries' . . . be interpreted as ex-
tending from the coast line more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean
or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico").
41. Id. § 1312.
42. 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
43. Id. at 273.
44. Complainant Alabama's Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint
and Complaint at 57-72, Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954) (Alabama grant extends
only to three-mile belt; any greater grant to other states denies equal footing and results
in making Alabama's sovereignty inferior); Brief for Complainant Rhode Island at 10,
Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954) (Rhode Island claims Submerged Lands Act
violates equal footing clause).
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the Constitution, could divest itself of the "public domain. ' 4, Justice
Douglas, the author of Louisiana and Texas, and Justice Black, the
author of California, relied on the equal footing doctrine to argue that
Congress had no authority to "relinquish elements of national sover-
eignty over the Oceans." 46 The new Court in Alabama, however, over-
turned Texas sub silentio by holding that Congress in a postadmission
grant could separate property interests in the seabed from national
sovereignty. 47 The Court subsequently confirmed Congress's power to
cede federal "property" to states in unequal portions.48 Recently, in
United States v. Maine,49 the Court reaffirmed the results of its Tide-
lands Cases by upholding the paramount rights of the federal govern-
ment to the continental shelf5" outside the marginal sea.51 Thus it re-
45. 347 U.S. at 273.
46. Id. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting); see id. at 282 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Douglas viewed federal powers over submerged lands as "incidents of national sover-
eignty" that could not be "abdicated" without undermining the equality of states the
equal footing clause required. Id. at 282-83.
47. See 34 B.U. L. REv. 504, 507 (1954) (Alabama "tacitly repudiated" Texas); cf. 30
U. MIAMI L. REv. 203, 213 (1975) (Submerged Lands Act, granting seabed rights to states,
is "de facto repudiation" of prior rationale for vesting control in federal government).
Texas and Alabama indicate that the Court perceived a difference between a grant at
admission and a grant after admission. The Texas plurality viewed seabed rights as so
intertwined with sovereignty as to be inseparable at admission. Otherwise "there is or
may be in practical effect a subtraction in favor of Texas from the national sovereignty
of the United States." 339 U.S. at 719. A seabed grant after admission, however, "was
merely an exercise of" paramount national power. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515,
524 (1975). This reasoning fails to explain the argument in Texas that in the case of
seabed rights, property rights (dominium) follow and commingle with sovereignty (im-
perium). 339 U.S. at 719. In effect, the underpinning of Texas was overturned because
in Alabama the Court found property rights separate and separable from national
sovereignty. But cf. p. 840 infra (harmonizing results of Alabama and Texas).
48. In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960), and United States v. Florida, 363
U.S. 121 (1960), the Court recognized claims under the Submerged Lands Act by Texas
and Florida for dominium over three marine leagues in the Gulf of Mexico, but denied
similar claims by Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Texas and Florida showed that it
was the intention of Congress to recognize the extended boundaries that existed at the
time of Texas's admission to the Union and at the time of Florida's readmission after
the Civil War. This showing of congressional intent was the sole element necessary to
establish entitlement under the Submerged Lands Act. United States v. Louisiana, 363
U.S. 1, 29-30 (1960).
49. 420 U.S. 515 (1975). The defendants in Maine were the 13 states bordering the
Atlantic Ocean. Id. at 516-17.
50. Continental shelves have typically been defined
as those slightly submerged portions of the continents that surround all the con-
tinental . .. mass that forms the lands above water. They are that part of the
continent temporarily (measured in geological time) overlapped by the oceans. The
outer boundary of each shelf is marked by a sharp increase in the slope of the sea
floor. It is the point where the continental mass drops off steeply toward the ocean
deeps.
H.R. REP. No. 215, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 6, reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 1385, 1390.
51. 420 U.S. at 527-28.
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mains unclear whether the equal footing doctrine is a constitutional
bar to a congressional grant of disproportionate seabed rights to an
incoming state. In light of subsequent cases, it cannot be argued that
the Texas decision settled this question.
II. The Equal Footing Doctrine: A Historical Reinterpretation
One reason the submerged lands cases seem confused or inconsistent
is that the Court has never adequately defined the content or sources
of the equal footing doctrine. The equal footing doctrine ultimately
rests on concepts of federalism: the United States is a "union of po-
litical equals."'5 2 Although superficially derived from a clause common
in statehood compacts,15 3 equal footing in this century has emerged as
an amalgam of constitutional and statutory precepts. Constitutional
principles alone act as an affirmative limitation on congressional power
to negotiate terms in compacts of admission, but statutory precepts also
guide courts as they interpret such compacts.
A. The Constitutional Component of the Equal Footing Doctrine
The Constitution provides that "[n]ew States may be admitted by
the Congress into this Union."54 Congress may, on "penalty of deny-
ing admission," require any conditions for entry into the Union.55
Since the admission of Ohio in 1802,56 Congress has imposed on states
a variety of special conditions that have limited the sovereign and
political powers that states can exercise after admission.57 On the other
52. Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 (C.C.D. Or. 1889) ("The doctrine that new states
must be admitted . . . on an 'equal footing' with the old ones does not rest on any ex-
press provision of the constitution ... but on what is considered . . . to be the general
character and purpose of the union of the states. . . -a union of political equals.")
53. See p. 836 infra.
54. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. See generally Park, Admission of States and the
Declaration of Independence, 33 TEMP. L.Q. 403, 405 (1960) (five procedural methods by
which states have historically been admitted).
55. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 568 (1911); cf. Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198, 216
(1872) (how states will be admitted is political question to be settled by territorial residents
and Congress-not courts).
56. See Enabling Act of Ohio, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173 (1802). Prior to Ohio's admission,
Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee, the first three states added to the new union, were
admitted without the imposition of conditions. See An Act for the admission of Tennes-
see, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 491 (1796); An Act for the admission of Vermont, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 191
(1791); An Act admitting Kentucky, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189 (1791). For an explanation of
enabling acts and acts of admission, see Park, supra note 54, at 405 (enabling act author-
izes constitutional convention whereas act of admission ratifies admission of state; act of
admission need not be preceded by enabling act).
57. See note 60 infra (examples of conditions); Dunning, Are the States Equal Under
the Constitution? 3 POLITICAL ScL Q. 425 (1888) (conditions imposed on incoming states
in nineteenth century); Park, supra note 54, at 406-10 (conditions imposed in twentieth
century).
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hand, since the admission of Tennessee in 1796,5s Congress has in-
cluded in each state's act of admission a clause providing that the state
would enter the Union "on an equal footing with the original States
in all respects whatever." 59 To eliminate the tension between "equal
footing" clauses and the conditions limiting the sovereign and political
powers of particular states after admission, ° the Supreme Court in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries held the conditions to be
either valid exercises of Congress's commerce or property powers0' or
state constitutional provisions that could later be removed by the
amendment process.
62
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court struck down one such condition
in 1911 in Coyle v. Smith.63 The Court in Coyle upheld an Oklahoma
statute moving the state capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City against
a challenge that the move violated the state's enabling act. Plaintiff, a
property owner in Guthrie, claimed that the statute contravened a
condition in the act under which the state had agreed not to move its
58. See An Act for the admission of Tennessee, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 491 (1796).
59. See Hanna, supra note 9, at 523-24. Prior to Tennessee's admission, Vermont and
Kentucky were each "received and admitted into this Union, as a new and entire member
of the United States of America." An Act for the Admission of Vermont, ch. 7, 1 Stat.
191 (1791); An Act Admitting Kentucky, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189 (1791). This language is close to
the equal footing terminology, although the phrase is not used explicitly.
60. In reviewing the conditions imposed on states, one nineteenth century scholar
suggested that "the theory that all states have equal powers must be regarded as finally
defunct." Dunning, supra note 57, at 452. Many of the conditions commonly imposed
upon incoming states, such as the duties to keep navigable rivers toll-free for United
States citizens and tax nonresident and resident proprietors equally, see, e.g., Enabling
Act of Louisiana, ch. 21, § 3, 2 Stat. 641 (1811), were grounded in Congress's constitu-
tional powers. Other less common conditions, such as requirements that state constitu-
tions provide that government officials be literate in English, see, e.g., Enabling Act of
New Mexico and Arizona, Pub. L. No. 61-219, § 2, 20, 36 Stat. 557 (1910), or that polyg-
amous marriages be prohibited, see, e.g., Enabling Act of Utah, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107
(1894), did not involve matters that were generally viewed at that time as subject to federal
regulation. See C. BEARD, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITIcs 459-72 (4th ed. 1926) (states
in eighteenth and nineteenth century differed widely in self-imposed electoral require-
ments); G. Curtis, Admission of Utah: Limitation of State Sovereignty by Compact with
the United States 17 (1887) (opinion pamphlet) (Constitution reserved to states power to
control domestic relations, including polygamy; Utah's power limited because of terms of
compact of admission).
61. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (property
clause); see, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 38 (1913) (conditions relating to
regulation of affairs with Indian tribes within commerce power clause); Stearns v.
Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 250 (1900) (provisions relating to federal property within power
to dispose of property).
62. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 568 (1911) (dictum); accord, Brittle v. People, 2 Neb.
198, 218 (1872); see Monnet, Violations by a State of the Conditions of its Enabling Act,
10 COLUM. L. Rav. 591, 605 (1910) (Congress cannot "keep a State in tutelage after it
comes into the Union"; state can always amend its constitution).
63. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
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capital before 1913.14 The Court held that under the equal footing
doctrine Congress cannot, as a condition of admission, either place
limitations on the powers of a new state or demand the right to
exercise powers over a new state not authorized by the Constitution.
The Court suggested for the first time that the equal footing doctrine
derived its force not merely from the inclusion of an equal footing
clause in acts of admission, but also from the constitutional imperative
of equality among the states. 0 It asserted that the words "this Union"
in Article IV of the ConstitutionG7 refer to "a union of States, equal in
power, dignity and authority, each competent to exert that residuum
of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution
itself."
8
The holding in Coyle rested on notions of "dual federalism." Under
this doctrine federal and state governments were viewed as fully in-
dependent in their respective spheres of power, with federal powers
enumerated by Article I and all other powers reserved to the states by
the Tenth Amendment. 9 As a result, Congress cannot in an act of
admission diminish or impair the sovereign and political powers of an
incoming state, including the power to designate its capital.70
64. Id. at 563-64; see Enabling Act of Oklahoma, Pub. L. No. 59-234, § 2, 34 Stat. 267
(1906). The condition was not included in the state's constitution but was adopted in a
separate ordinance. 221 U.S. at 564-65.
65. 221 U.S. at 573.
66. Id. at 580.
67. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. I ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union .... ")
68. 221 U.S. at 567.
69. The term "dual federalism" was coined by Professor Corwin. See E. CORWIN, THE
TwiLrHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 1 (1934). He used the term to describe the judicial ap-
proach to federalism that prevailed from the Taney Court to the New Deal. Id. at 50.
Many of the Supreme Court's decisions before the New Deal reflected dual federalist
notions. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77-78 (1936) (Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act unconstitutional because taxing power cannot be used for federal regulation in
area reserved to states); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273-76 (1918), overruled,
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941) (Act of 1916 to prevent interstate com-
merce in products of child labor unconstitutional as federal intrusion into state matters).
See generally M. VILE, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 68 (1961) (under dual
federalism, exercise of federal government's constitutional powers limited by state sover-
eignty; Tenth Amendment frequently invoked to curtail express congressional power);
Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1950) (federal and state
governments are co-ordinate with and equal to one another).
70. 221 U.S. at 573 (sovereign and political powers of incoming states cannot be "con-
stitutionally diminished, impaired or shorn away by any conditions, compacts or stipula-
tions" in acts of admission).
The equal footing doctrine, however, does not require the equality of states in the
manner in which they exercise sovereign and political powers. For example, in such
matters as powers delegated to the three branches of government or to local governments,
the arrangements of the states vary substantially. Compare CAL. CONST. arts. IV, V
(delegating general powers to autonomous executive branch; relying extensively on ref-
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Conversely, the equal footing doctrine, based on notions of sover-
eign equality, might also prohibit the enlargement of the powers of
particular states into areas granted by the Constitution to the national
government. This inversion of the constitutional equal footing doc-
trine formed the basis for the Court's 1950 plurality decision in United
States v. Texas.71 Although it did not explicitly hold that Congress
could not expand the sovereign and political powers of an incoming
state in a compact of admission, the Court plurality cited constitu-
tional reasons as preventing "any implied, special limitation of any of
the paramount powers of the United States in favor of a State. ' 72
Since 1937, the doctrine of dual federalism has been replaced by
theories of "cooperative federalism." Under cooperative federalism,
federal and state governments are viewed as sharing powers and func-
tions, although national powers and interests take precedence over
state sovereignty.73 Consistent with this more expansive view of federal
sovereignty, the plurality opinion in Texas suggested that the equal
footing doctrine "prevents extension of the sovereignty of a State" into
an area of paramount rights of the United States "from which the
other States have been excluded, just as it prevents a contraction of
sovereignty ... which would produce inequality among the States.
74
erenda) with LA. CONST. arts. III-VI (containing specific and detailed delimitation of
powers, duties, and organization of three branches and of local governments). Addition-
ally, the courts have historically validated congressional power to control the formation
and content of constitutions of states entering the Union. As a result, states differ in the
sovereign and political powers they exercised at admission. See p. 835 supra. The equal
footing doctrine permits each state after admission to choose to exercise the same de-
gree of sovereign and political powers as every other state. Cf. Case v. Toftus, 39 F.
730, 732 (C.C.D. Or. 1889) ("true constitutional equality between the states . . . extends to
the right of each . . . to have and enjoy the same measure of local or self government").
71. 339 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1950); see Frost, Judicial Expansion of Seaward Boundaries
Above Submerged Lands, 16 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 235, 242 (1961) (Texas plurality used
concept of "'converse equal footing' ").
72. 339 U.S. at 717; see id. at 718 (United States responsibilities with respect to "foreign
commerce, the waging of war, the making of treaties, defense of the shores, and the like"
compel conclusion that United States's supremacy over seabed must be unabridged).
73. See Corwin, supra note 69, at 21 ("cooperative conception of the federal relation-
ship"). Cases after 1937 have reflected the cooperative federalist notions. See, e.g., Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1975) (interference with state affairs by application
of Economic Stabilization Act to state employees upheld as within rational congressional
exercise of power); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (Fair Labor Standards
Act upheld even though it affected state sovereignty; national government can "resort to
all means for the exercise of a granted power"). See generally M. REAGAN, THE NEw
FEDERALISm 21-23 (1972) (constitutional revolution of 1937 began view of federal and
state cooperation in "running programs" and in "passing statutes," as state powers no
longer held to impede or limit national powers). The Court has, nevertheless, recently
moved to limit notions of cooperative federalism. See National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Tenth Amendment affirmative limit on commerce power when
legislation infringes on state sovereignty)-
74. 339 U.S. at 719-20 (citation omitted).
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The Texas plurality, however, returned to a model of dual federalism
by assuming that exclusive federal control over the seabed was
necessary.7
5
The Court in Alabama v. Texas76 was misguided in not addressing
the constitutional equal footing arguments. 7 The reasoning in Texas
required the Alabama Court to determine whether the Submerged
Lands Act undermined the constitutional "equality of States" so as to
make them "'different in [the] dignity and power'" that they share as
co-equal members of the Union.78 Because the Alabama Court did not
consider the constitutional language in Texas, the latter opinion should
not be understood to bar affirmative congressional actions that vest
seabed rights in some states that are greater than those enjoyed by other
states.7 0
B. The Statutory Component of the Equal Footing Doctrine
Ultimately, the holding in United States v. Texas80 must be viewed
as turning on statutory, not constitutional interpretation. Although
the Constitution guarantees sovereign equality to the states, it does not
ensure their economic or proprietary equality. Because state sover-
eignty includes the right to acquire and to dispose of property,8 " and
because the Constitution gives Congress plenary power to grant federal
lands to the state, -82 equality either in size or in percentage of public
lands held among the states would be unrealistic.8 3 Acts of admission,
75. Under dual federalism, federal and state governments were viewed as co-equals,
supreme in their independent spheres. See p. 837 supra. The plurality, by coalescing
imperium and dominium, returned to a view of separate and independent spheres of
government, which was a touchstone of dual federalism thinking.
76. 347 U.S. 272 (1954) (per curiam).
77. See note 47 supra (Court may have believed that there was no equal footing issue
involved in post-admission grant); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 281 (1954) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (Court treated equal footing as "frivolous and insubstantial").
78. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 720 (1950) (plurality opinion) (quoting Coyle
v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (1911)).
79. At most, constitutional principles merely create a rebuttable presumption that
states' compacts of admission grant equal seabed rights. See p. 840 infra.
80. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
81. This right is equal, in the absence of constitutional or statutory limitations, to
that of an individual disposing of land. See, e.g., South San Joaquin Irrigation Dist. v.
Neumiller, 2 Cal. 2d 485, 489, 42 P.2d 64, 66 (1935); Bjerke v. Arens, 203 Minn. 501, 503,
281 N.V. 865, 866 (1938).
82. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (property clause); see Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272,
273 (1954) (per curiam) ("The power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is
without limitations.")
83. States currently vary widely in geographical size and in the extent to which the
federal government owns public lands within their boundaries. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1977, at
197, 227 (1977).
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moreover, reveal a wide variation in the property rights possessed by
particular states upon their entry into the Union. Texas and Florida,
for example, came into the Union with generous grants of public lands,
but most other states have received very limited property grants from
Congress in their compacts of admission.
84
Interpreting the statement in Texas that the equal footing doctrine
has a "direct effect on certain property rights,"8' 5 specifically on the
right to exploit submerged lands, remains a problem. This finding
can be harmonized with the holding in Alabama v. Texas86 only if
Texas is understood to have involved statutory interpretation of the
equal footing clause in the state's act of admission. 7 The act did not
discuss the submerged lands issue, so the Texas plurality faced the
question whether the state could retain prior title by implication. The
Court plurality held only that the Constitution prevented such an
implication, not that Congress could not, if it had so desired, have
made an explicit grant of title.88 The constitutional language supported
the plurality's presumption that Texas had no greater property rights
than other states. Such a presumption could have been rebutted by a
showing of an express provision in the compact of admission that vested
dominion in the incoming state. 9
The Court in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan9" held that property rights
to the beds of inland waters belong to the states. 91 The Tidelands Cases
reached the opposite result for offshore lands, because "national in-
84. Unlike other states, Texas was allowed to retain its vacant and unappropriated
lands. This retention was permitted in order that the state would be able to pay the
debts and liabilities it had incurred as a Republic. Joint Resolution for annexing Texas
to the United States, J. Ras. 8, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 797 (1845); see P. GATES, HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT 316 (1968) (at admission, Florida was granted 62%.,
Louisiana 38%, and Alaska 28% of public land areas with remainder retained by federal
government).
85. 339 U.S. at 716 (plurality opinion).
86. 347 U.S. 272 (1954) (per curiam).
87. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 715 (1950) (plurality opinion) (plurality
held that dominium over Texas's seabed vested in federal government because "'equal
footing' clause of the Joint Resolution admitting Texas to the Union disposes of . . . the
controversy" of control over area).
88. See p. 838 supra.
89. The Texas plurality found that Texas's historical proof of dominium, while a
Republic, over its three marine leagues seabed was insufficient to overcome the presump-
tion that such dominium had been relinquished. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707,
717-18 (1950). Subsequently, the Maine Court held that Congress had exercised its "para-
mount national powers" by transferring seabed rights to the states in the Submerged
Lands Act. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 524 (1975). It thus appears that Congress
can disavow federal control conferred by the equal footing doctrine over the seabed
bordering any state by an express provision in the compact of admission.
90. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
91. Id. at 230; see p. 830 supra.
840
Vol. 88: 825, 1979
Puerto Rican Seabed Rights
terests, responsibilities, and therefore national rights are paramount. '92
The Alabama Court assumed, without so deciding, that seabed rights
were mere property rights. 93 The failure of the Alabama Court lay in
not overturning the holding in the Tidelands Cases that seabed rights
were interests "so subordinated to political rights as in substance to
coalesce and unite in the national sovereign. ' 94 By upholding the
federal power to cede submerged lands, the Alabama Court overturned
the reasoning of Texas9" that although "dominium and imperium are
normally separable and separate," in some cases "property interests are
so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as to follow sovereignty." 96
No apparent reason exists to allow the separation of property from
sovereignty in statutes like the Submerged Lands Act, while preventing
such a separation in acts of admission. Therefore, the constitutionally
based presumption of federal control over the seabed imposed by the
equal footing doctrine can be overcome. Puerto Rico need only secure
Congress's agreement to an express grant in its act of admission.
III. Seabed Rights as Property Rights
The Court has ruled that a grant of three marine leagues to some
states does not undermine the constitutional equality of states.97 The
question remains whether a congressional grant of seabed rights of 200
miles to Puerto Rico on admission to the Union would be an uncon-
stitutional "subtraction in favor of" Puerto Rico "from the national
sovereignty of the United States."98 Such a grant would not, however,
compromise national supremacy, 9 for the right to exploit the seabed,
under both American and international law, is alienable. 00 Such a
92. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 36 (1947); see United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707, 719 (1950) (plurality opinion); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704
(1950).
93. 347 U.S. at 273 (per curiam).
94. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950) (plurality opinion).
95. See p. 834 supra.
96. 339 U.S. at 719 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). But cf. p. 840 supra
(harmonizing results of Alabama and Texas).
97. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273-74 (1954) (per curiam) (upholding constitu-
tionality of Submerged Lands Act).
98. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950) (plurality opinion).
99. To avoid confusion, this discussion will use national "supremacy" to refer to the
sovereignty of the federal as against the state governments. This concept involves federal
supremacy in the areas designated by the Constitution. The word "sovereignty" in the
international sense denotes the plenary powers of individual nations as against one
another and will be used as such throughout this discussion.
100. See p. 834 supra; p. 843 infra.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico can claim the sovereign right to explore and ex-
ploit its seabed under international law. The Continental Shelf Convention, sukra note
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grant should be upheld against any equal footing challenge by other
states' 01 or by the Justice Department.
10 2
Congress, a court should hold, can alienate seabed rights in any way
it chooses. It may, for example, make such an express provision in a
compact of admission, because a commingling of sovereignty with
property rights is no more essential in the 200-mile zone than it is in
the smaller zone at issue in Alabama v. Texas.'0 3 Any other conclusion
would be at odds with principles of American and international law
that have recognized not only the difference between imperium and
dominium over the seabed, but also the difference between sovereignty
over the sea and sovereignty over the seabed.
0 4
The Truman Proclamation, 0 5 the first claim by a major coastal
nation to rights over the continental shelf and its resources, 00 avoided
use of the word "sovereignty" and only referred to "jurisdiction and
control" in order to signify that the United States' claim extended
only to the right to exploit the resources of the shelf, not to sovereignty
4, which the United States has ratified, states that "[t]he coastal State exercises over the
continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources," id. art 2(1). In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice held that the right to explore the continental shelf and exploit its
natural resources was inherent in the coastal State-the rights existed "ipso facto and ab
initio." [1969] I.C.J. 4, 22. One study has concluded that the current United States claim
to the continental shelf of the Commonwealth departs from prevailing international law
and practice under which overseas departments and associated states, without representa-
tive votes in metropolitan governments, exercise control over the coastal seabed. T.
FRANCK, CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES BY SEMI-AUTONOMOUS STATES 27-29 (1978).
A coastal State's exclusive right to exploit the seabed does not preclude it from
transferring its right, as long as the consent is express. Continental Shelf Convention, supra
note 4, art. 2(2). Therefore, under international law, Puerto Rico and the United States
can agree in a compact of admission who will receive the benefits of exploiting the sea-
bed. See Submerged Lands Act: Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, S. 294, S. 107, S. 107 Amend., S.J.
Res. 18 Before the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1066 (1953)
(Jack Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser, Dep't of State) (international community unconcerned
about way United States divides its rights over seabed with states) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on Submerged Lands Act].
101. In Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954) (per curiam) states challenged a dis-
proportionate grant of seabed rights to other states. See p. 833 supra.
102. The Justice Department brought the submerged lands cases challenging the right
of Gulf states to the three marine leagues limit. See United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121
(1960); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960). The executive need not agree with
a congressional grant of seabed rights to a state and could therefore seek to overturn a
congressional grant in a compact of admission. Cf. Veto of Bill Concerning Title to
Offshore Lands, 1952-1953 PUB. PAPERS 379 (Truman veto of first Submerged Lands Act).
103. 347 U.S. 272 (1950) (per curiam).
104. See Daniel, Sovereignty and Ownership in the Marginal Sea, 3 BAYLOR L. REV.
243, 248-56 (1951) (distinction between ownership of seabed and sovereignty over waters,
and dual rights in marginal sea).
105. Exec. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67, 68 (1945).
106. See A. Sinjela, Land-Locked States and the Contemporary Ocean Regime 303-05
(1978) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School) (on file with Yale Law Journal)
(prior to 1945, few claims to continental shelf made and those made largely concerned
with fishing conservation).
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over the sea.107 Both Congress and executive officials premised the
Submerged Lands Act on the separability of national supremacy and
property rights over the seabed.'08 Finally, the separability of property
and full sovereignty rights in the high seas was recently evidenced by
American creation of a 200-mile zone of "exclusive fishery manage-
ment authority," in which the United States claimed the power to
regulate one resource of the high seas without asserting sovereignty
over the area. 0 9
The Court in United States v. California" viewed the possibility of
international obligations concerning the seabed as bolstering the neces-
sity for national control of the area."- The international community,
however, has generally followed the American view that sovereign
rights over the high seas are separate from exploitation rights over the
resources of sea lands."
2
Article 2 of the Continental Shelf Convention of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Law of the Sea accorded to coastal states the exclu-
sive power to exercise "over the continental shelf sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources."
113
The Informal Composite Negotiating Text of the ongoing Law of the
Sea Conference incorporates the same provision of coastal state right
to explore the shelf."41 Neither provision in any way prevents a coastal
state from consenting to alienate these rights. 1 5 The Composite Text
107. Exec. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67, 68 (1945); id. ("The character as high
seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded
navigation are in no way thus affected.")
108. See, e.g., Hearings on Submerged Lands Act, supra note 100, at 512-14 (Douglas
McKay, Secretary of Interior) (United States controls submerged lands, regardless of
property rights); S. REp. No. 133, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 5-6, reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1474, 1479 (Submerged Lands Act grants property rights, not con-
stitutional rights). But see pp. 846-47 infra (federal government by invoking eminent
domain can recapture any seabed grants).
109. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, §§ 101-
102, 90 Stat. 336 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1812 (1976)).
110. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
Ill. Id. at 35.
112. See 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 789-882 (1965) (development
and acceptance of continental shelf doctrine). Some nations continue to claim that the shelf
is inseparable from the high seas and therefore not subject to appropriation. See 2 Third
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (Caracas, Venez.) (18th mtg.) 152, U.N. SALES No.
E. 775, v.4 (July 29, 1974) (Mr. Upadhyaya, Nepal delegate). Other nations have claimed
sovereignty over both the shelf and the high seas. See 1 S. LAY, R. CHURCHILL & M.
Noiwquisr, NEW DIREcTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 15-16 (1973) (Brazilian claim of com-
plete sovereignty).
113. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(1); see id. art. 1 (right to exploit
shelf to limits of exploitability); id. art. 3 ("rights of the coastal State over the continental
shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas").
114. Composite Text, supra note 4, arts. 76, 77(1) (coastal state right to exploit seabed
up to distance of 200 nautical miles).
115. See id. art. 77(2) (rights to shelf exclusive unless exploration consented to by
coastal state); Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2) (same).
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also proposes the creation of a 200-mile economic zone"1 6 under which
coastal states have absolute rights "for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether
living or non-living, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the superjacent
waters.""17 In short, the right to exploit the seabed, properly defined,
is simply a property right not necessarily commingled with national
supremacy. Thus a grant to Puerto Rico of seabed rights at admission
would not be a "subtraction in [its] favor.., from the national sover-
eignty of the United States.""18
IV. Seabed Grant Proposal and Its Limitations
The equal footing doctrine's rebuttable presumption of national
property rights to the seabed makes the right to exploit seabed re-
sources a negotiable condition in Puerto Rico's bargaining for ad-
mission." 9 Therefore Puerto Rico should seek a specific grant of sea-
bed rights in a compact of admission. The federal government can,
however, constitutionally regulate or terminate the rights to exploit
the seabed secured in a compact. The main protection available for
the island against a "taking" of its seabed rights is an explicit calcula-
tion of just compensation in its compact of admission.
116. The economic zone is an area "200 nautical miles from.the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Composite Text, supra note 4, art. 57. In
the economic zone the coastal state has absolute rights of exploitation, see note 117
infra, and jurisdiction for purposes of research, environmental preservation, and con-
struction, see Composite Text, supra note 4, art. 56(I)(b).
117. Composite Text, supra note 4, art. 56(I)(a). Control over the economic zone and
control over the continental shelf involve a concomitant 200-mile limit. See id. arts. 57, 76.
Although sovereign rights for exploitation purposes are absolute in the shelf, see id. art.
77(2), coastal states nevertheless have an affirmative duty under certain conditions to give
access to other States in the economic zone, see, e.g., id. art. 69 (land-locked state's right
to participate in exploitation of economic zones of adjoining coastal states).
118. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950) (plurality opinion).
119. Puerto Rico's bargaining position would be strengthened if it could establish
ownership of the seabed as a commonwealth. See notes 5 & 100 supra (controversy over
ownership of island's seabed; island's right to continental shelf under international law).
Congress's grant to the states in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-31, § 3,
67 Stat. 30 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1970)), was motivated by a desire to restore
historic title to the states. See note 38 supra. Historic title is not, however, necessary to
Puerto Rico's demands: congressional power to cede federal lands is "plenary" and
"without limitation." Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273-74 (1954) (per curiam). In
construing the Submerged Lands Act, the Court relied on historic title to the seabed only
in searching for congressional intent to grant submerged lands to the state at admission.
See note 48 supra. Federal control of the island's seabed resources while it remains a
commonwealth would not bar the island from claiming the resources at the time it seeks
admission.
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A. Considerations for a Specific Grant
Puerto Rico may seek to include in any compact of admission
language granting the island the right to explore and exploit the
natural resources of the seabed to the extent recognized by the inter-
national community. -1 2 0 In order to ensure that the grant of seabed
rights to Puerto Rico will be sufficiently specific, the language used in
other gTants of seabed rights should be replicated:12' "The term 'nat-
ural resources' includes, without limiting the generality thereof, oil,
gas, and all other minerals,"' 22 including sand, gravel or coral,' 23 and
all other living organisms sedentary to the seabed. 24 Puerto Rico's
demands should seek to encompass all rights recognized by the United
States in international agreements. 12 The grant should also follow the
Submerged Lands Act in affirming the imperium rights of the United
States.
26
120. Current international law favors the recognition of sovereign rights over 200
miles of seabed. See Composite Text, supra note 4, arts. 56, 57. At minimum, Puerto Rico
could seek the right to explore its seabed to the limits of exploitability, see note 5 supra,
a right recognized in the Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 4, art. 1, which the
United States has ratified. Ratifications and Accessions to the Conventions, U.N. Doc. ST.
LEG./3 REv. 1 (Apr. 12, 1961).
121. It is beyond the scope of this Note to propose the exact language of a seabed
grant. Such language will require extensive negotiations because many problems of def-
inition and jurisdiction exist. Cf. Note, Jurisdiction Over the Seabed: Persistent Federal-
State Conflicts, 12 URB. L. ANN. 291, 297-99 (1976) (establishment of baselines from which
to measure state control, shifting of coastlines, and pollution and environmental controls
are issues currently in dispute between federal and state governments). In addition, if
the United States were to sign an international agreement such as the Composite Text,
sup~ra note 4, before the island's bid for statehood, the language of a seabed grant would
have to account for any international obligations the federal government had incurred.
122. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, § 2, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1970).
123. In the Conveyance of Submerged Lands to Territories Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-435, § 1, 88 Stat. 1210 (current version at 48 U.S.C. § 1705(a) (Supp. V 1975)), the United
States gave Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa title to their marginal sea.
The grant excepted oil, gas, and other minerals from the grant but included "coral, sand
and gravel." The inclusion of both phrases in the proposed grant would leave no doubt
as to the meaning of Puerto Rico's demands for "mineral resources."
124. Composite Text, supra note 4, art. 77(4) (natural resources of shelf include "living
organisms belonging to sedentary species").
125. The rights could include those agreed upon in the Composite Text, supra note
4, if it should be ratified or in the Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 4, which
has already been ratified by the United States, see note 120 sutra.
126. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, § 6, 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1970):
[T]he United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of
regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional pur-
poses of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of
which shall be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include, proprietary rights
of ownership, or the rights of management, administration, leasing, use, and develop-
ment of the lands and national resources ... vested in ... the respective States. ...
Congress viewed this section as superfluous, but included it in the Act to safeguard against
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 825, 1979
B. The Limits of a Grant to Exploit Seabed Resources
The seabed is directly related to federal exercise of powers over
national defense, the conduct of foreign affairs, world commerce, and
navigation .127 In order to effect these constitutional powers, Congress
is empowered both to enact laws regulating the seabed 28 and to take
state submerged lands.129 Congress can, therefore, subsequently reg-
ulate or take back in exercise of its constitutional powers any right that
it might grant to Puerto Rico in its compact of admission.
Such regulation or taking after admission is highly probable. Federal
energy and environmental policies have recently led Congress to regu-
late seabed mining. 30 Treaties involving the seabed will likely limit
exploitation by guaranteeing freedom of navigation and cable place-
ment.1
3 1
The one safeguard that would be available to Puerto Rico if Con-
gress were to take back seabed rights granted in a compact of admission
is that provided by the Fifth Amendment: any taking by the federal
government to execute its constitutional powers must include just
compensation. 3 2 If the federal government acquires ownership of the
the national sovereignty concerns expressed in the Tidelands Cases. See Hearings on Sub-
merged Lands Act, supra note 100, at 1368 (Sen. Jackson) ("[T]he constitutional provision
... is purely surplus anyway. If we have exclusive rights under the Constitution, there is
nothing we can do to change it.")
127. The relation of the seabed to the exercise of these important federal powers is
evidenced by the difficulties that concerns with military defense, foreign affairs, com-
merce, and navigation created in developing a consistent United States policy on the law
of the sea. See Hollick, Bureaucrats at Sea, in NEw EPA OF OCEAN POLITICS 1-2 (A.
Hollick & R. Osgood eds. 1974) (law of sea encompasses complex array of issues that
resulted in shifting American policies).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967) ("power to regulate
navigation confers upon the United States a 'dominant servitude'" that empowers it to
take submerged lands without compensation); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
365 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1961) (similar).
129. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534
(1941) (Congress empowered to take state's submerged lands in exercise of commerce
power); California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 268 (9th Cir. 1968) (United States can
condemn state's submerged lands but must pay compensation; lands not valueless because
submerged and unused).
130. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (West Supp. 1978) (safety regulations for exploitation of
outer continental shelf).
131. See Composite Text, supra note 4, art. 58 (freedom of navigation in economic
zone guaranteed by coastal states); id. art. 79 (right to lay submarine cables and pipelines
on continental shelf given to all signatories).
132. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation"). Although it need not compensate states for submerged lands
taken for the purpose of regulating navigation, see note 128 supra, the federal govern-
ment must provide compensation for the condemnation of state property for any other
public purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242 (1946); California v.
United States, 395 F.2d 261, 263-64, 264 n.5 (9th Cir. 1968).
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Puerto Rican seabed or regulates it so as to constitute a "taking,"' 133
Puerto Rico should be reimbursed. Although environmental or naviga-
tional limitations are likely to be viewed as regulation and therefore
noncompensable, 134 American alienation of seabed rights by treaty
should be treated as a taking.
135
Even though there must be compensation for any taking, Puerto
Rico's property interest in the seabed might be undervalued. To en-
force the constitutional mandate of just compensation, courts rely on
"the concept of market value: the owner is entitled to the fair market
value of the property at the time of the taking."''11 The "highest and
most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed,
or is likely to be needed in the near future" must be considered in
determining the fair market value.'37 Future use must be within a
reasonable time, 38 based on a known and provable market,: 39 and
exploitable without substantial expenditure of capital. 40 An owner,
such as Puerto Rico, would be compensated for the "highest and most
profitable use" to which it put its seabed at the time of taking. The
133. Although public regulation can reduce market value of private land without
compensation, see, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (up-
holding zoning ordinance as within state's police power), an owner must be compensated
if deprived of all reasonable economic use for the property regulated, see Costonis, "Fair"
Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land
Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021, 1051 (1975) (under reasonable beneficial use
test, landowner allowed reasonable economic return on property). See generally C. BERGER,
LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 630-31 (2d ed. 1975) (four proposals commonly used to reconcile
"police power vs. taking").
134. See United States v. 422,978 Square Feet of Land, 445 F.2d 1180, 1184 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1971) (history of Supreme Court cases holding regulation for navigational purposes
noncompensable); cf. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLum.
L. REv. 650, 666-67 (1958) (regulation to prevent public harm within police power and
noncompensable).
135. Cf. United States v. 50 Foot Right of Way or Servitude, In, Over and Across
Certain Land, 337 F.2d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 1964) (taking of land for pipeline to aid naviga-
tion noncompensable; compensable if taken for any other reasons).
136. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) (footnote omitted); see Danforth
v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 283 (1939) (just compensation means value at time of
taking).
137. United States v. 1,291.83 Acres of Land, 411 F.2d 1081, 1084 (6th Cir. 1969); see
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ("highest and most profitable use" test).
138. See note 137 suPra (citing cases).
139. United States v. 1,291.83 Acres of Land, 411 F.2d 1081, 1084 (6th Cir. 1969); Mills
v. United States, 363 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1966). Evidence of minerals may be used in
determining the market value of land, but future demand for the mineral must have
some objective support. "Mere physical adaptability to a use does not establish a
market." United States v. Whitehurst, 337 F.2d 765, 771-72 (4th Cir. 1964) (footnote
omitted).
140. United States v. 1291.83 Acres of Land, 411 F.2d 1081, 1084 (6th Cir. 1969); United
States v. 2,635.04 Acres of Land, 336 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1964). The mere existence of
mineral deposits is not sufficient; the minerals must be exploitable. See Mills v. United
States, 363 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1966).
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minerals of the submerged land would be treated as one element af-
fecting the market value of the lands taken, but would not be
separately valued. 14 1 Puerto Rico would not be compensated for the
quantity of minerals in the lands or for any unknown minerals the
lands contained.
142
Puerto Rico and the United States could agree that compensation
be provided for those losses that courts normally find noncompensable,
and could provide at admission a formula for calculating the com-
pensation. The federal right to eminent domain cannot be abridged
by contract, 143 but the "Fifth Amendment does not prohibit land-
owners and the Government from agreeing between themselves as to
what is just compensation for property taken .... Nor does it bar them
from embodying that agreement in a contract ....
Various methods of adjusting the constitutional measure of just
compensation could be devised. For example, a simple reasonable
return above fair market value could be agreed on to compensate for
any unknown uses of the lands at the time of the taking. Second, the
quantity and quality of minerals in the lands could be estimated at
the time of taking and then multiplied by a fixed price per unit agreed
on in the compact of admission. 4 A court could be directed in the
compact of admission to determine the future income stream by this
multiplication method, then subtract expected cost of production-
in essence, to capitalize profits.' 46 Puerto Rico could demand that this
capitalized estimate serve as the measure of compensation.
141. Courts have not permitted separate valuation of the quantity and quality of
minerals, multiplied by a fixed price per unit because such valuation is speculative and
uncertain. See, e.g., Georgia Kaolin Co. v. United States, 214 F.2d 284, 286 (5th Cir. 1954);
United States v. Land in Dry Bed, 143 F. Supp. 314, 317-18 (S.D. Cal. 1956); 4 J. SACKMAN,
NIcHoLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.22 (P. Rohan 3d rev. ed. 1977) (valuation of
lands containing mineral resources).
142. See note 141 sukra (citing cases); Mills v. United States, 363 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir.
1966) (minerals in land must be known and exploitable).
143. See Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) ("[E]minent domain is an
attribute of sovereignty .... It cannot be surrendered, and if attempted to be contracted
away, it may be resumed at will." (citations omitted)); Contributors to Pa. Hosp. v.
Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 23 (1917) (contract restraining eminent domain "inefficacious
for want of power").
144. Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599, 603 (1947) (citation omitted); see United
States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) ("Congress may .. .provide . . . that particular
elements of value or particular rights be paid for even though in the absence of such
provision the Constitution would not require payment.")
145. One possibility is to agree to use the fair market value of the minerals at the
time of the taking as the fixed price. Of course this method can be used only when
quality and quantity can accurately be estimated.
146. One court has accepted the multiplication or capitalization of profits method in
an eminent domain context. See State Highway Comm'n v. Nunes, 233 Or. 547, 559, 379
P.2d 579, 585 (1963). See generally Note, Valuation in Eminent Domain Cases-Use of the
Multiplication Method in Valuing Mineral Deposits, 36 ALsM. L. REv. 753 (1972) (arguing
for this method).
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Although it requires speculation about future markets, technology,
and return on investment, the last method is well-known in the law.147
The valuation method is irrelevant unless a taking occurs; but if sea-
bed rights are taken, then some speculation is preferable to the al-
ternative of noncompensation for potential minerals in the seabed.
Conclusion
The American experience with colonialism in the early half of this
century148 has left the United States with responsibility for several
small, economically poor dependencies.149 Some of these, like Puerto
Rico, may seek statehood unless they are accorded a greater measure
of self-government15O Accommodations between the federal govern-
ment and an incoming state such as Puerto Rico, involving, inter alia,
rights to the seabed, could help the new state to overcome its economic
problems. This Note has shown that for Puerto Rico the only bar to
the creation of such rights is political, not legal. The question is
whether the present fifty states would be willing to grant to Puerto
Rico a right that states have not obtained or preserved for themselves.
147. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Nunes, 233 Or. 547, 556, 379 P.2d 579, 584
(1963) (stating that frequently impossible as practical matter not to use capitalization
method in valuation); In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416, 421-40 (1941) (Chapter X
of Bankruptcy Act requires courts to judge whether reorganization plans are "fair and
equitable, and feasible"; judgment necessitates projections of earnings, remaining economic
life, and capitalization rates for corporations); I.R.C. § 167 (projections must be made of
useful life and obsolescence of assets in computing depreciation).
148. See J. PRATT, A.mElcA's COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 58 (1950) (Spanish American War
"opened the door of a colonial career to the United States"); Woodward, Empire Beyond
the Seas, in THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 518-37 (" Blum 2d ed. 1968) (era of manifest
destiny, imperialistic stirrings, and white man's burden).
149. See note 148 supra (citing sources); Letter from Ruth G. Van Cleve, Director,
Office of Territorial Affairs, Dep't of the Interior (Apr. 4, 1978) (on file with Yale Law
Journal) (compiling per capita income of American territories); Office of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, Basic Industrial Facts on Puerto Rico-1975 (1976) (reporting
island's per capita income).
150. Some sentiment for statehood in the future has, for example, also been reported
in the Virgin Islands. See Macridis, Political Attitudes in the Virgin Islands, in VIRGIN
ISLANDS 193, 202 (J. Bough & R. Macridis eds. 1970).
It is conceivable that Puerto Rico would settle for less than statehood, if the arrange-
ment conferred greater autonomy than that provided by the current commonwealth
status. For example, in 1975, after two years of deliberations, the Ad Hoc Advisory Group
on Puerto Rico, a committee composed of presidential appointees and delegates chosen
by the Governor of Puerto Rico, made its recommendations for greater island control
over its economic programs and international affairs. See REPORT OF THE AD Hoc AD-
VISORY GROUP ON PUERTO Rico, COMPACT OF PERMANENT UNION BETWEEN PUERTO Rico
AND THE UNITED STATES 87-100 (1975). President Ford's New Year's Eve statehood proposal,
however, was made in lieu of an endorsement of the proposed compact. Text of Ford
Puerto Rico Statement, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1977, at 5, col. 1. The President apparently
found that statehood within the American system was more attractive than a more
autonomous form of commonwealth status.
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